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Unitary Taxation in the United States of America
T HE AUTHORITY OF a state to impose taxes on income, property,transfer of wealth, and transactions is an inherent part of its
sovereignty. In principle, there is no restraint upon the authority of a
state to tax, provided the subject of taxation is jurisdictionally amen-
able to that state and the tax does not amount to a form of confisca-
tion of property. To be legitimate there must be a territorial or other
genuine link between the taxing authority and the person or property
taxed.'
Taxation of the world income of, or the transfer of wealth by or to,
natural or juridical persons on the basis of nationality, domicile, or
residence does not violate international law since such taxation is
based on actual or constructive presence within the taxing jurisdiction.
A state may also exercise jurisdiction to tax non-national, non-
domiciliary, or non-resident natural or juridical persons with respect
to income derived from or associated with their presence or their
doing business within its territory, or income derived from ownership
of property located there. Taxation by a state of property or its trans-
fer which is located within its territory is permissible under interna-
tional law. The lex situs prevails. Lastly, a state may tax transactions
that occur, originate, or terminate within its territory or that have a
substantial relation to this state. Here the links with the taxing state
are local economic activity or the status of the particular property. In
general, states do not always use all these bases of jurisdiction to tax
nor have they attempted to tax persons or property that have no
connection with their territory whatever.
Usually, when a juridical person has foreign branches or subsidi-
aries, each is taxed as a separate economic unit on the basis of the
income of the entity established within the taxing state. However,
1 D. P. O'Connel, International Law 787-88 (1965), citing George W. Cook
(U.S.) v. United Mexican States, IV UNRIAA 593, at 595 (1930). Also see
A. R. Albrecht, "The Enforcement of Taxation under International Law,"
( 1953) 30 Br. Y.B. Int'l L. 454.
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some states have taxed local parents, affiliates, or subsidiaries under a
system of unitary taxation whereby the total world income of the
economic unit made of the parent and its affiliated establishments is
determined and a portion of it is attributed to the taxing state pur-
suant to a certain formula.
For instance, in the United States of America a number of states
have adopted the unitary business tax for corporations. This tax is
not really related to source income, but rather to the reasonable rela-
tion to business done in the state.' The unitary tax has been chal-
lenged by foreign states on the ground that it is contrary to interna-
tional law.
The United States government has taken the position that the
utilization of the world-wide unitary business concept and apportion-
ment formula method of allocation of income among multinational
enterprises engaged in foreign commerce is unconstitutional in that it
conflicts with the position the United States has taken with other
nations regarding the appropriate standards and methods to be util-
ized in allocating income among commonly controlled multinational
enterprises.
According to the unitary tax concept all the integrated activities of
a group of affiliated corporations are combined for tax purposes.
Once it is determined that the activities conducted by the member
corporations are interdependent, the entire operations of the group
become subject to tax in the state using this principle on the basis of a
formula of apportionment. The unitary method concentrates on sub-
stance rather than form and treats all integrated business operations
uniformly, whether they are conducted through foreign corporations,
branches, or tax havens. This method eliminates deferral. It also
avoids the difficulties of enforcement of the arm's-length direct system
of taxation used by most states since source is not the only basis upon
which the income attributable to a state may be measured.
A formula of apportionment is used to determine the amount of
income generated by the entire operation that is properly attributable
to the activities conducted within the taxing state. For instance, Cali-
fornia uses the combined report, which is a consolidated return of the
corporate group's world-wide income in order to determine the pro-
portionate parts of the total income of the corporate group upon
2 See Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act, 7A U.L.A. 33!. For
an up to date list, see West's Annotated California Codes, Revenue and Taxa-
tion Code, ss. 23001-28ooo (1988 Cumulative Pocket Part, at 172).
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which the individual members are taxable.' The California unitary
tax system is by far the most significant one in terms of economic
impact on international business activities. The unitary tax concept is
opposed to the separate accounting method or arm's-length method,
which, although it purports to isolate portions of income received in
various states, may fail to account for contributions to income result-
ing from functional integration, centralization of management, and
economies of scale. Also it is difficult to establish fair arm's-length
prices for goods transferred or basic international services rendered
between controlled branches or subsidiaries of an enterprise.
The unitary method used in California involves the following steps:
First, it must be determined whether the operations of a corporate
group conducted partly within and partly without the state of Cali-
fornia are unitary. A business is not unitary unless interdependent
basic operations are carried on to a substantial extent in different
states by the branches or subsidiaries that comprise the controlled
enterprises; there must be functional integration and economies of
scale resulting in a flow of value among the various operations.
Second, it is necessary to apportion a certain amount of the total
income that includes foreign source income to the state of California.
This is done by using a three-factors formula: all business income of
an integrated group of corporations is apportioned to the state of
California by multiplying such income by a fraction, the numer-
ator of which is the property factor, plus the payroll factor, plus
the sales factor and the denominator of which is three.' The fac-
tors are determined by dividing the average value of the corporate
group's California property by the value of its world-wide property ;'
the total amount of its California payroll, by its world-wide payroll ;'
and the amount of its total California sales by its total world-wide
sales.7
Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act, West's Annotated Cali-
fornia Codes, ss. 25120-39 and Regulations promulgated thereunder. For a
good analysis, see L. Steven Spears, "Application of the Unitary Business Con-
cept to Diverse Business: Light at the End of the Tunnel or the Impossible
Dream?" (1987), 18 Pac. L. J. si61.
4 S. 25128.
5 S. 25129.
6 S.25132.
7 S. 25134.
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total
in-state property + in-state payroll + in-state sales X corporate
total property total payroll total sales income
= income taxable
3 by California
It does not matter whether the California operations do not generate
net income under the separate accounting method. If the world-wide
operations show a net profit, California will consider the entire opera-
tions and allocate a portion of such profit to the state.'
This unitary tax has been criticized on the grounds that:
- It results in a multiple tax burden, or double taxation, unless the
tax paid is offset by a reduced tax elsewhere.
- It conflicts with internationally accepted standards of allocation
and apportionment used by the United States federal government.9
- It is contrary to tax treaties and commerce treaties which oppose
unitary taxation. Commerce treaties prohibit tax discrimination
against business entities of the other contracting party and "no
tax shall be imposed in excess of that reasonably allocable or ap-
portionable to its territories." The treaty with France goes further,
providing that the basis for taxation must be directly related to
activities within the taxing jurisdiction.'0 The Treaty with Japan"
prohibits tax treatment that is more burdensome to a foreign state
entity than to a domestic entity. The fact that United States cor-
porations doing business in Japan are not taxed by Japan on the
basis of world-wide income shows that there is discrimination.
- It enables California to collect taxes if no profit or even if losses
exist in that state, thus resulting in double taxation.'
2
8 See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioners of Taxes of Vermont, 1oo S. Ct. 1223,
445 U.S. 425; 63 L.Ed. 2d 5 10 ( i 98o), where it was held that it is permissible
for a state to include foreign source dividends in a multinational corporation's
apportionable tax so long as there is a unitary relationship between the payor
foreign corporation and the recipient domestic corporation.
9 That is, the arm's-length standard of allocation whereby is taxed only the
income that would have resulted to the taxpayer corporation had it dealt with
the other members of the group at arm's-length in the conduct of its business.
10 Convention with respect to taxes on income and property with exchange of
notes, July 28, 1967, 719 U.N.T.S. 31 and Protocols of 1970, 1978 and 1984:
23 U.S.T. 20, 30 U.S.T. 5109.
11 Convention for Avoidance of Double Taxation, March 8, 1971, 23 U.S.T.
967, T.I.A.S. No. 7365.
12 See argument of Plaintiff-Appellant in Shell Petroleum N.V. v. Graves et al.,
709 F. 2d 593 (9th Cir., 1983) certiorari den., 104 S. Ct. 537, 464 U.S. 1012,
78 L.Ed. 2d 717 (1983).
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- Distortions result, since California wages are much higher than
elsewhere in the world. Thus the payroll factor over-allocates
world-wide income to California.
- Property costs are substantially higher in California than elsewhere
in the world, again over-allocating world-wide income to Cali-
fornia.
- The sales factor also over-allocates world-wide income as it does
not take into account the relationship between profits and sales.
- California allocates world-wide profits without adjustments for
other demonstrable differences. For instance, profits in developing
states may be higher in relation to cost to reflect greater increased
risks of expropriation, currency exchange limitations, tax holidays,
and other factors. The result may be to allocate part of this risk
profit (which is really a contingency reserve) to California.
- California allocates world-wide income even when such income
includes substantial profits in foreign states that are blocked and
that would not be subject to United States federal tax law until
unblocked.
From a United States constitutional law point of view, a state carl-
not promote taxation that discriminates against interstate commerce.
When foreign commerce is involved, state taxes must not create a
substantial risk of multiple taxation on the international level or inter-
fere with the federal regulation of foreign commercial relations."3
Thus, the unitary method of taxation by interfering with the power
of the federal government to conduct foreign relations violates the
Foreign Commerce Clause and the Supremacy Clause. 4 Further-
more, due process precludes a state from taxing value earned outside
its borders unless there is a minimal connection or nexus between the
interstate activities and the taxing state and a rational relationship
between the income attributed to the state and the intrastate value of
the enterprise.' 5 In addition, the out-of-state activities of the unitary
business must be related in some concrete way to the intrastate activi-
1s See Foreign Commerce Clause, U.S. Constitution, Art. I, s. 8, cl. 3. The
power to regulate foreign commerce is reserved exclusively to the United States.
14 Since the Federal Executive possesses the sole and exclusive authority to con-
duct and control foreign affairs between the United States and foreign nations,
state statutes that conflict with the constitutional exercise by the United States
of its authority to conduct and control the foreign relations of the United States
are void under the Supremacy Clause.
15 See Due Process Clause, U.S. Constitution, 14 th Amendment, para. s.
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ties. The Foreign Commerce clause of the United States Constitution
was intended to eliminate double taxation in interstate and foreign
commerce.
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that apportion-
ment of the income of corporations engaged in the conduct of busi-
ness, both within and without the taxing state, is constitutionally
permissible provided that multiple tax burdens do not result or pro-
duce arbitrary or unreasonable results. On the other hand, it is un-
constitutional for a state to tax corporate profits earned elsewhere,
but a state may use a formula to determine what is properly attribut-
able to activities within its borders.
In Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles"0 the United States
Supreme Court held invalid under the Commerce Clause an ad
valorem tax imposed by California on property found in the state
on a given date, in this case containers belonging to a foreign shipping
company, and used exclusively in international trade. The court was
of the opinion that the California tax prevented the United States
from speaking with one voice in international trade and subjected the
containers to multiple taxation.
On the other hand, in Container Corporation of America v. Fran-
chise Tax Board,"7 the United States Supreme Court upheld the right
of California to tax income earned outside the United States by a
United States multinational group. The majority of the court was of
the opinion that:
- The business must be unitary before taxation can disregard the
boundaries of separate corporate entities and treat the commonly
owned group as a single taxpayer. The prerequisite to a constitu-
tionally acceptable finding of unitary business is a flow of value
not a flow of goods.
- The unitary system must not result in excessive taxation of income
earned outside the United States by comparison to income earned
in the United States.
The Container Corporation had not demonstrated that income
apportioned to California was out of all appropriate proportion to
the business transacted in California. Furthermore, the risk of double
taxation was the same as if the direct method of taxation had been
used. The court came to the conclusion that the double taxation of
16 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
17 io3 S. Ct. 2933, 463 U.S. 159 , 77 L.Ed. 2d 545 (1983) reh. den. i04 S. Ct.
265, 464 U.S. 909, 78 L.Ed. 2d 248 (198o).
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foreign income to which Container Corporation was subject did not
rise to the level of a constitutional infirmity within the two tests set
forth in the Japan Line decision: the need to permit the federal
government to speak with a single voice in regulating foreign com-
merce and the need to avoid inevitable multiple taxation.
Multiple taxation is not necessarily excessive taxation. Here we are
dealing with a United States-based group and state taxes were de-
ductible for federal income tax purposes, which is not the case with
respect to foreign income taxes (or where the United States corpora-
tion does not pay any federal income taxes).
With respect to foreign-based groups, there is the foreign policy
effect to take into consideration, which was present in the Japan Line
case, but not in the Container case. Will the court exclude unitary
taxation in the case of foreign-based groups, a question expressly left
open by the justices? As the court held, it is constitutionally not per-
missible for a state to tax instruments of foreign commerce in a man-
ner that could be considered burdensome by the foreign state and that
would invite retaliation against United States companies. Today, as a
result of these cases, related domestic and foreign corporations may be
treated as a unitary business to the extent that there is a sharing or an
exchange of value throughout the multinational corporate group as
evidenced by substantial mutual interdependence. In other words, in
Container, the court held that the world-wide combined income of a
domestic corporation and its foreign subsidiaries is subject to unitary
apportionment, without contravening the due process and foreign
commerce clauses, as long as the unitary business test has been prop-
erly applied and the apportionment formula is fair.
In Alcan Aluminum Ltd. v. Franchise Tax Board of Cal.,"8 a Can-
adian parent corporation challenged the use of California's unitary
taxation method to determine its United States subsidiary's (Alcan
Corp.) income tax liability. The court held that the parent lacked
standing to challenge the use of that method since the parent's claim
that California imposed a tax directly on its income was invalid and
thus the parent had no distinct and palpable injury on which to base
a claim of standing. The claim made by Alcan of direct taxation was
invalid because California's tax is specifically structured to tax a cor-
poration in proportion to the amount of business it does in California.
The unitary tax is not a taxation of the parent on non-California
business or income. Since the profits of a unitary business arise from
18 558 F. Supp. 624 (S.D.N.Y., 1983).
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the operation of the business as a whole, it becomes misleading to
characterize the income of the business as having a single identifiable
source. Also, the unitary tax was imposed neither upon foreign com-
merce, nor upon Alcan itself.'9
In order to remain within the permissible limits of international
law, it would be better to apply the world-wide combined reporting
under the unitary tax system to foreign subsidiaries of United States
parent corporations only and to exempt from it local subsidiaries of
foreign parents, especially where neither the foreign parents nor their
subsidiaries are doing business in the unitary state. Another possibility
called the "water's edge alternative" would be to limit state unitary
taxation to domestic United States operations. The state would base
its apportionment calculations on United States income as reported
by the corporation in its federal return. This is calculated by the
arm's-length method and therefore consistent with international prac-
tice and federal policy. Double taxation is avoided by international
negotiation concluded by the federal government. California, for
instance, would not concern itself with the details of the international
allocation, but could apportion the American income using its three-
factors formula. In 1986 several of the states that had adopted the
unitary tax formula considered abandoning it for fear of losing a
major share of new foreign investment.
Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany, the United Kingdom, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Luxembourg, The Netherlands, and Switzerland have objected to
the unitary method of taxation on the ground that it constitutes "a
serious obstacle to further development of trade and investment rela-
tionships."'" Also, in July 1985, the Parliament of the United King-
dom passed legislation retaliating against United States corporations
operating in unitary tax states." The legislation denies parent corpor-
19 See also EMI, Ltd. v. Bennett, 56o F.Supp. 134 (D.C. 1982), aff'd 738 F. 2d
994 (9th Cir., 1984) certiorari den., 464 U.S. 1073, 83 L. Ed. 2d 5o8 (1984) ;
Alcan Aluminum Ltd. v. Department of Revenue of State of Oregon, 724 F.
2d 1294 (7th Cir., 1984) ; Shell Petroleum N.V. v. Graves, supra, note 12.
And Brief as amicus curiae of the United States in Alcan Aluminum Ltd. v.
Franchise Tax Board of Cal. and Imperial Chemical Industries v. Franchise
Tax Board of Cal., reported in (1986) 25 Int'l Leg. Mat. 683. Also Alcan
Aluminum, Ltd. v. Department of Revenue of State of Oregon, 724 F. 2d
1294 (7th Cir., 1984).
20 See (1986), 25 Int'l Leg. Mat. 705.
21 Finance Act, 1985, c. 54, s. 54 (1986), 25 Int'l Leg. Mat. 734. This section
is to take effect after an order has been before the House of Commons and
approved by a resolution.
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ations doing business in such states tax credits on the taxes they pay
to the United Kingdom on account of dividends paid in England by
their subsidiaries and imposes substantial penalties on them. These
credits reflect the income taxes the United Kingdom subsidiaries pay
with respect to the income they distribute as dividends.
Proposed federal legislation in the United States would prohibit
any state of the United States from imposing an income tax on any
taxpayer on a world-wide unitary basis.2
J.-G. CASTEL
Osgoode Hall Law School
York University, Toronto
22 See Draft Legislation preventing Unitary Taxation by States ( 1985). (1986),
25 Int'l Leg. Mat. 739 et seq., Dec. 16, 1985, 9 9 th Congress, 1st Sess., Unitary
Tax Repeal Act, Bill S. 1974.
Sommaire
L'imposition unitaire aux ttats-Unis d'Am~rique en mati~re
d'imp6ts sur le revenu
L'auteur soutient que les ltats des Atats-Unis d'Amirique violent le
droit international lorsqu'ils imposent les socigts qui font affaires chez
eux sur la base du revenu global du groupe de socijtis auxquelles elles
appartiennent. Une formule spiciale permet d'attribuer un certain mon-
tant de ce revenu global ei la socigtj qui fait affaires dans un Atat qui a
adopti ce syst~me et qui en tiendra compte pour Vimposer. Le syst~me
de ripartition des revenus imposables aboutit h une double imposition
contraire aux traitds signis par les lAtats-Unis avec un grande nombre de
pays y compris le Canada. Dans une certaine mesure, il est aussi con-
traire h la Constitution des 1tats-Unis et aux r~gles coutumi~res du droit
international se rapportant ti la compitence ligislative des Atats. Sans
aucun doute, le syst~me unitaire constitue un obstacle aux investisse-
ments itrangers.
